Protecting dignity under common law and the Constitution: the significance of crimen iniuria in South African criminal law by Burchell, Jonathan
Protecting dignity under common 
law and the Constitution: 
The significance of  crimen iniuria1 
in South African criminal law
JONATHAN BURCHELL*
1  Introduction
Implicitly or explicitly, the core of the protection of fundamental 
human rights can be found in the value of individual dignity – in the 
sense of the self-worth, uniqueness, identity, autonomy, privacy and 
freedom of all human beings. This concept of dignity lies at the heart 
of equal respect for human worth (equality) that underpins all human 
rights ideologies.
A significant facet of the South African Constitution of 1996 is that 
the Bill of Rights (Chapter 2) explicitly, not just impliedly, respects and 
protects such human dignity.2 Furthermore, it is important to bear in 
mind that the South African concept of dignity, in its constitutional, 
civil and criminal setting, is not completely comparable with that in the 
German Basic Law. Under South African law, dignity is of fundamental 
worth, but it is not inviolable – it can be limited and, as will be seen, 
for convincing reasons.
South African criminal theory is founded on the premise that State 
intervention in the form of criminal conviction and sanction must respect 
and protect this inherent individual dignity of all. Thus, individual 
dignity, autonomy and freedom, constitute both the foundation of the 
* BA LLB (Natal), LLM Dip Comp Leg Stud (Cantab), PhD (Wits); Emeritus Professor 
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1 According to Wikipedia, the term crimen injuria seems to involve a misunderstanding 
of the Latin phrase crimen iniuriae, which should mean ‘accusation of abusive 
behaviour’; apparently, the word ‘crimen’ never means crime per se. However, South 
African courts have used the term crimen iniuria to describe the crime of iniuria. 
In this article, the spelling ‘iniuria’ is preferred to that of ‘injuria’ as the former 
spelling reflects the original Latin. However, it is acknowledged that the South 
African courts have, for many years, used the anglicised spelling of ‘injuria’. 
2 In s 10 of the Constitution of South Africa of 1996. L Ackermann Human Dignity: 
Lodestar for Equality in South Africa (2012) 115 reminds us that the German Basic 
Law protects dignity (menschenwürde) and H Botha ‘Human dignity in comparative 
perspective’ (2009) 20 Stell LR 171 at 175 points out that dignity is central in other 
constitutions, such as those of Greece, Portugal, Spain, Namibia, the Russian 
Federation and Poland.
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essential elements of criminality3 and the precision of their definition.4 
Furthermore, respect for fundamental rights must not only underlie 
the definition of criminality, but also the entire criminal process5 and 
indeed the sentencing phase as well.6 Respect for human dignity must, 
and does, permeate all stages of criminal prosecution.
The manifestation of respect for, and protection of, human dignity 
in the South African, post-constitutional criminal trial has been 
examined by Shannon Hoctor,7 and so will not be canvassed in this 
article. The focus of this piece is more on a specific, unique feature of 
substantive criminal law in South Africa – the crime of crimen iniuria 
that provides the source of the actual protection of human dignity in 
criminal prosecutions.
After brief mention of the origin of this crimen iniuria and its 
development by the courts, a clearer meaning of the concept of 
dignity in the criminal law should begin to emerge. Furthermore, the 
compelling justification for the specific protection of dignity in the 
criminal law – not just in the common law of crime, but also in the 
South African statutory criminal law that only some twenty years ago 
emerged from an apartheid system premised on the comprehensive 
denial of human worth – will also become apparent. This paper will 
then turn to crimen iniuria’s special potential as a means of protecting 
human dignity within criminal theory.
Given the fundamental role of dignity in the criminal trial, it is 
perhaps surprising that only the South African criminal law, unlike the 
criminal law of other countries, contains a description of a specific, 
non-statutory crime encompassing the unlawful and intentional 
3 The element of voluntariness of conduct, causation, criminal capacity (especially in 
its form of conative capacity) and intention are based on free will or autonomy: see J 
Burchell Principles of Criminal Law 4ed (2013) 67-8, 92, 247-50, 344-5 respectively. 
4 Under the principle of legality, on which see Burchell op cit (n3) 33-44.
5 See section 35 of the Constitution of South Africa, 1996, for these due process 
rights. The fundamental presumption of innocence and the right to a fair trial 
clearly reflect this emphasis on the human dignity of all: S Hoctor ‘Dignity, criminal 
law, and the bill of rights’ (2004) 121 SALJ 304 at 307-8. 
6 The dignity of all individuals lies at the heart of the prohibition on ‘cruel, inhuman 
and degrading’ punishment and poses a fundamental challenge to the utilitarian-
based approaches to punishment, such as that of general deterrence: Hoctor op cit 
(n5) 308. Sentencing principles based on proportionality (just deserts), rehabilitation 
(reformation) or restorative justice would be more compatible with the imperatives 
of human dignity. 
7 Op cit (n5).
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impairment of dignity8 or privacy.9 The Roman and South African 
criminal theory contains such a crime known as crimen iniuria. Like 
the actio iniuriarum in the civil law of delict,10 crimen iniuria in 
the South African criminal law contains considerable potential for 
protecting dignity in its various forms.11 In the process of analysing 
this uniquely South African concept of crimen iniuria, comment on 
another closely-related crime against personality (criminal defamation) 
will be inevitable.
2  Origins of crimen iniuria
The concept of infringement of dignitas12 was developed in Roman law 
as a form of unlawful conduct called iniuria and probably punished in 
that system and Roman-Dutch law as a crime.13
The lack of similar protection of dignity, as such, under the English 
law prevailing in South Africa during the 19th century, seems to have 
accounted for the dearth of judicial authority in the South African 
courts on crimen iniuria during this period.14
8 As opposed to the protection of reputation achieved by a crime of defamation.
9 The concept of crimen iniuria in South African jurisprudence includes protection 
of privacy as part of dignity. Some countries, like the United States of America, use 
a concept of ‘privacy’ essentially to perform the role of ‘dignity’, but any remedy for 
invasion of privacy is restricted in that country to private law: J Burchell Personality 
Rights and Freedom of Expression: The Modern Actio Injuriarum (1998) 367-8.
10 J Burchell ‘Beyond the glass bead game: human dignity in the law of delict’ (1988) 
4 SAJHR 1; J Burchell ‘Personality Rights in South Africa: Reaffirming Dignity’ in 
Whitty, NR & Zimmermann, R Rights of Personality in Scots Law – A Comparative 
Perspective (2009) 349-81; J Burchell ‘Retraction, Apology and Reply as Responses 
to Iniuria’ in Descheemaeker, E and Scott, H (eds) Iniuria and the Common Law 
(2013) 197-214. Pickering J in Ryan v Petrus 2010 (1) SACR 274 (ECG) commented, in 
passing, that the elements of ‘injuria’ are the same whether under the civil law of 
delict or the criminal law ‘although every insult to dignity which is serious enough 
to found a civil action will not necessarily be serious enough to warrant criminal 
prosecution’. For a fuller consideration of an element of seriousness for a criminal 
prosecution, see section 5 below.
11 On the potential for protection of dignity in private law, see especially J Burchell 
Rights of Personality in Scots Law – A Comparative Perspective op cit (n10). 
Governmental crime statistics for 2011-12 revealed that reported incidents of crimen 
iniuria in the Western Cape rose by 11% from 7 337 in 2010/11 to 8 185. The use of 
racially-offensive language often forms the bulk of reported incidents. 
12 Although the Roman concept of dignitas may, originally, have been linked to an 
idea of rank or status (see E Descheemaeker ‘Solatium and Injury to Feelings: 
Roman Law, English Law and Modern Tort Theory’ in Descheemaeker, E and Scott, 
H (eds) Iniuria and the Common Law op cit (n10) 94), dignitas has been used by 
the South African courts in a sense extending well beyond status and, ultimately, 
approaching a concept similar to self-worth and autonomy. 
13 See J van der Berg ‘The criminal act of violation of dignitas’ (1988) 1 SACJ 351-376.
14 See J van der Berg Personality in Criminal Law LLM (Natal) (1987) 246-7. 
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However, in 1908 in R v Umfaan,15 Innes CJ clearly acknowledged 
that serious iniuriae were, in principle, criminal under South African 
law. In 1912 in R v Kobi16 (a case of indecent exposure) the Transvaal 
court rejected an argument that crimen iniuria had become obsolete 
and in 1914 in R v Jacob17 a ‘peeping Tom’ was convicted of crimen 
iniuria or crimen extraordinarium by a Transvaal court. In 1915 
in R v M,18 the Cape court followed the Transvaal court in holding 
that indecent exposure in private was punishable as crimen iniuria. 
Thereafter crimen iniuria became well established as a crime in South 
African criminal law.
Although the punishment of private indecent exposure was part 
of the formative development of crimen iniuria in South Africa, the 
establishment of crimen iniuria was by no means confined to indecent 
exposure, whether private or public, and was applied by the courts to 
invasions of privacy (peeping Toms)19 and, in later years, to insulting 
words.20
Arguably, the common-law crime of public indecency (unlawfully, 
intentionally and publicly committing an act which tends to deprave 
the morals of others or which outrages the public’s sense of decency 
and propriety)21 infringes the ius certum aspect of the principle of 
legality. Notions of ‘depraving morals’ and ‘decency’ are too slippery 
to define. If public or private indecency is to be punished, it is best 
that the elected representatives of the people define the boundaries of 
indecency in sufficient detail to comply with the constraints of legality. 
This is, in effect, what the legislature has done in sections 9, 10, 19, 
22 and 25 of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) 
Amendment Act 32 of 2007.22
Shorn of its nebulous public indecency origins, the remaining 
concept of dignity covering not just the uttering of insulting words 
15 1908 TS 62 at 67.
16 1912 TPD 1106.
17 1914 JS § 29 (T).
18 1915 CPD 334.
19 The name is said to be that of the citizen of the town of Coventry who peeped at the 
legendary Lady Godiva as she rode naked through the streets to protest high taxes.
20 See section 3 below.
21 See Q v Marais (1889) 6 SC 367 and the Scottish High Court of Judiciary in Webster 
v Dominick 2003 SLT 975; 2003 SCCR 525 holding that the crime of ‘shameless 
indecency’ is too vaguely defined as not to have an independent existence in Scots 
law, but reaffirming the crime of public indecency by analogy with South African 
law; see J Burchell and C Gane ‘Shamelessness scotched: the domain of decency in 
Scots law’ (2004) 8 Edin LR 231-248. 
22 The sections (9 and 22) prohibiting ‘flashing’ appear to be restricted to the real 
exposure or display of the actual genitals, anus or breasts of an actual person as 
opposed to an artistic depiction or simulation of these body parts: see Burchell 
Principles op cit (n3) 765-6.
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and the invasion of another’s privacy but also the broader protection 
of identity, equality and freedom forms the focal point of this article.
3  Judicial development of the scope of dignitas or dignity
The most frequent prosecution for crimen iniuria has been to punish 
disrespectful words and invasions of privacy:
3.1  Abusive, insulting23 or degrading communications24 and 
other conduct
South African case law reveals that vulgar abuse,25 gross impertinence,26 
insults27 and humiliation28 may lead to a conviction of crimen iniuria.
In S v Sharp29 the accused had called a policewoman a ‘bitch’ in the 
presence of her colleagues. Although the high court did hold that the 
23 In the civil law, the courts have recognised that the remedy for impairment of 
dignity is not confined to insult (contumelia): Burchell Personality Rights op cit (n9) 
331-2. 
24 Section 16(2)(c) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, states 
that the right to freedom of expression does not extend to ‘advocacy of hatred 
that is based on race, ethnicity, gender or religion, and that constitutes incitement 
to cause harm’. Section 10 of the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair 
Discrimination Act 4 of 2000 goes further than s 16(2) of the Constitution by 
protecting ‘hurtful’ not just ‘hateful’ speech.
25 As in R v Dibden 1967 (1) PH H137 (RA).
26 As in R v Walton 1958 (3) SA 693 (SR) (X convicted when, asked to stop making a 
noise by a mother so that her child could sleep, he said to her ‘Come here lady and 
I will give you another’).
27 S v M 1979 (2) SA 25 (A) (‘white bitch’); S v Bugwandeen 1987 (1) SA 787 (N) (‘black 
bastard’). The epithet ‘kaffir’ has become regarded as self-evidently an iniuria 
(Ciliza v Minister of Police 1976 (4) SA 243 (N); S v Puluza 1983 (2) PH H150 (E); S 
v Steenberg 1999 (1) SACR 594 (N)); Ryan v Petrus 2010 (1) SACR 274 (ECG) where 
the words ‘teef’ (‘bitch’), ‘naaier’ (‘fornicator’), ‘hoer’ (‘whore’) and ‘kaffir’ were 
held to constitute a serious impairment of the dignity of a woman, despite the 
fact that she was, at the time the words were directed at her, committing adultery; 
and S v Henning (ECJ 2004/008) [2004] ZAECCHC 14 (28 May 2004). Addressing a 
person by using the word ‘hotnot’ amounts to an insult to dignity, assessed both 
subjectively and objectively: S v Steyn (A480/2011) [2012] ZAWCHC 106 (10 February 
2012) at para [16]. See also B Jennings ‘Towards a new era of racial politeness?’ 
(1972–6) 1 Natal Univ LR 241. 
28 R v Sethuntsa 1945 EDL 128 (complainant forced to carry his own excrement in 
his hands through the streets of a town); S v Brereton 1971 (1) SA 489 (RA) (X, a 
farmer who had found some women stealing maize, made them strip to the waist 
before they walked home so as to punish them by humiliating them before his farm 
labourers): R v Chipo 1953 (4) SA 573 (A) (falsely reporting to the police that an 
employer had shot at his employees with a firearm) and S v Van der Merwe 2011 (2) 
SACR 509 (FB) (subjecting black personnel at a university to humiliating treatment 
and videoing their response). See also the protection of dignity under s 10 of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.
29 2002 (1) SACR 360 (Ck).
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charge of crimen iniuria was defective in that it had not been alleged 
that dignity had been impaired, it was nevertheless also stated by the 
court that ‘[b]y the very nature of her work as inspector in the SA Police 
Services it is more than likely that she had been exposed to situations 
previously where individuals had used rude or abusive language in 
her presence and probably even directed at her’.30 Furthermore, the 
court was of the view that the word ‘bitch’ is now part of everyday 
parlance and scarcely raises an eyebrow in conversations.31 The same 
conclusion, however, does not apply to the epithet ‘kaffir’ used to 
insult a black policeman as in S v Henning.32
A number of cases involving swearing at the police in Scotland (a 
country with a ‘mixed’ legal system based on a Roman law heritage) 
have been dealt with under the ragbag offence of breach of the 
peace.33 At times the Scottish courts have regarded swearing at the 
police as constituting a breach of the peace34 and at times they have 
refused to do so.35 Although in principle extreme cases of abusive 
behaviour directed at the police could constitute breaches of the 
peace in Scotland, the dominant approach seems to be epitomised in 
the High Court of Justiciary judgment in Smith v Donnelly,36 one of 
the leading cases on breach of the peace in that country. In Smith v 
Donnelly the court was of the view that a refusal to co-operate with 
the police, even if truculently stated, is not likely to constitute a breach 
of the peace and that the court must always bear in mind the demands 
of freedom of expression.
The decision in the South African case of Sharp,37 emphasising that 
the police should be sufficiently battle-hardened to be able to cope 
with certain vulgar epithets directed at them, is compatible both with 
the tenor of the Smith approach and the decision in Logan v Jessup38 
in Scotland. However, it seems that the racial slur implicit in calling 
30 Sharp supra (n29) at 372D.
31 Sharp supra (n29) at 372f–g.
32 Supra (n27), (a judgment of Pickering J in the Eastern Cape Division of the High 
Court).
33 For instance, Logan v Jessup 1987 SCCR 604 (where the court held that swearing at 
the police is not reasonably expected to cause harm as the police are to some extent 
battle-hardened not to be affected by such conduct); Niven v Macleod 1988 SCCR 
572; MacMillan v Normand 1989 SCCR 269; Mackay v Heywood 1998 SCCR 210; 
Kinnaird v Higson 2001 SCCR 427.
34 Niven; MacMillan; Mackay supra (n33).
35 Logan; Kinnaird supra (n33).
36 Smith v Donnelly 2001 SCCR 800.
37 Sharp supra (n29).
38 Logan supra (n33).
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a police officer a ‘kaffir’ in South Africa continues to be regarded as 
serious enough to warrant proceedings for impairment of dignity.39
3.2  Invasions of privacy
Privacy is now generally recognised as an important aspect of 
personality and enjoys the protection of the South African law of 
delict.40 In appropriate cases an invasion of privacy may amount to 
crimen iniuria.41 Voyeuristic peeping is one manifestation of this 
crime.42 Similarly, eavesdropping, telephone tapping, ‘bugging’ and 
various other forms of electronic surveillance may constitute an 
actionable invasion of privacy.43
In ‘peeping Tom’ cases, it seems that the crime is committed by the 
peeping; it is not necessary that the victim should be aware that she 
or he is being observed.44
3.3  Identity45 as a facet of human dignity
The German constitutional court in the Eppler case46 recognised that 
the general right to personality includes the right ‘to one’s own image 
and spoken word … the right not to have false statements attributed 
to oneself’.
In Grütter v Lombard47 the South African Supreme Court of Appeal 
affirmed the right to personal identity, including a person’s likeness 
39 For a brief discussion of the appropriate sentence, see section 5 below.
40 DJ McQuoid-Mason The Law of Privacy in South Africa (1978); J Burchell Personality 
Rights op cit (n9) ch 28; J Neethling, J M Potgieter and P J Visser Law of Delict 6ed 
(2010) ch 10 para 4.2 and J Neethling, J M Potgieter and P J Visser Neethling’s Law of 
Personality 2ed (2005) chs 8 and 10; and J Burchell ‘The legal protection of privacy 
in South Africa: a transplantable hybrid’ (2009) 13 Electronic J Comp Law (for the 
civil and Constitutional jurisprudence on privacy).
41 Van der Berg ‘The criminal act of violation of dignitas’ op cit (n13) 367ff.
42 See ‘peeping Toms’ above (n19).
43 Compare S v A 1971 (2) SA 293 (T); S v I 1976 (1) SA 781 (RAD).
44 See R v Holliday 1927 CPD 395.
45 Neethling, Potgieter and Visser Delict op cit (n40) 350 define the concept as:
   ‘Identity is that uniqueness which identifies each person as a particular individual 
and as such distinguishes him from others. Identity manifests itself in various 
indicia by which the person involved can be recognised: ie, facets of his 
personality which are distinctive of or peculiar to him, eg his life history, his 
character, his name, his creditworthiness, his voice, his handwriting, his outward 
shape, etc. Identity is thus infringed if indicia thereof are used in a way that does 
not reflect the person’s true (own) personality image.’
 This definition was quoted with approval by Nugent JA in Grütter infra (n47) at 
para [8].
46 BVerfGE 54 at 153.
47 (628/05) [2007] ZASCA 2 (20 February 2007) at paras [8]-[13].
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and name. Endorsing the statement of O’Regan J in Khumalo v 
Holomisa48 that no ‘sharp lines’ can be drawn between various facets 
of personality rights ‘in giving effect to the value of human dignity 
in our Constitution’, Nugent JA in Grütter concluded that the right to 
identity, subject of course to any defences based on legal policy,49 is 
protected under South African law.50
A person’s identity is intricately linked to personal information 
relating to his or her race, gender, marital status, nationality, ethnic 
origin, sexual orientation, age, health, religion, beliefs, language, 
physical address, telephone number and medical, financial, criminal 
and employment history. In fact, in an electronic age his or her e-mail 
address, location information or online identifier become intimately 
linked to a person’s identity and the confidentiality of the last-
mentioned electronic facets of identity become central to preventing 
what has become the modern version of what is loosely called ‘identity 
theft’.
The newly enacted Protection of Personal Information Act51 will 
play its part in providing remedies (both civil and criminal) for the 
unlawful collection, retention, dissemination and use of such personal 
information.52
However, greater protection against ‘identity theft’ is needed in South 
Africa. Where the traditional perception of theft as the appropriation 
of tangible rather than intangible property prevails, it is evident how 
important the availability of a charge of crimen iniuria for the unlawful 
and intentional appropriation of another’s identity would be. If the 
common law already protects individual identity under the concept of 
dignity, then there can be no fundamental legality objection to using 
existing remedies (both civil and criminal) for impairment of such 
dignity. The matter of identity theft is discussed more fully below.53
48 (2002) 5 SA 401 (CC).
49 See para [13]. 
50 See also Davis J in Wells v Atoll Media (Pty) Ltd (11961/2006) [2009] ZAWCHC 173; 
[2010] 4 All SA 548 (WCC) (9 November 2009).
51 4 of 2013, which was assented to on 19 November 2013. Certain sections of this 
Act came into operation on 11 April 2014 in terms of Proc R25 GG 37544. On 
informational privacy, see also Mistry v Interim Medical and Dental Council of 
South Africa 1998 (4) SA 1127 (CC).
52 See especially the eight conditions for lawful processing of personal information 
under ch 3 of the Act.
53 Section 6 below.
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4  The test for determining dignity developed by the 
common-law courts
In De Lange v Costa54 the Appellate Division authoritatively laid down 
the general test for determining dignity:
(a) The plaintiff’s self-esteem must have been actually impaired; and
(b) A person of ordinary sensibilities would have regarded the conduct 
as offensive (tested by the general criterion of unlawfulness or 
objective unreasonableness).
Thus the ultimate criterion for determining an impairment of dignity 
is not the sensibility of the plaintiff or complainant, nor that of the 
hypersensitive individual, but that of the reasonable person.
As a general rule, the victim must have been subjectively aware of 
the insulting or disrespectful conduct, otherwise there will not be a 
claim for damages or a criminal prosecution. So in Aphane v S,55 the 
subjective aspect of the test for dignity was not satisfied because the 
complainant did not say how she understood the statements. In fact, 
the charge will be defective if it does not contain an allegation that 
dignity has been impaired.56 If the victim, on becoming aware of the 
conduct, does not feel his or her dignity impaired by the conduct 
then, even though objectively the conduct is insulting, it would seem 
in general that crimen iniuria is not committed. However, there may 
be exceptional situations.
Is the crime committed if the victim remains unaware of the 
insulting or disrespectful conduct? There is authority for the view that 
the crime is committed where the victim is a young child or mentally 
defective and is thus incapable of understanding the nature of the 
conduct.57 So too, ‘peeping Toms’ have been convicted even though 
the person peeped at was unaware of what was happening or the 
invasion of privacy did not reveal any embarrassing information about 
54 1989 (2) SA 857 (A) at 862 (a civil case).
55 Unreported judgment of Southwood J in the North and South Gauteng High Court 
(A621/2007) [2009] ZAGPPHC 264 (10 September 2009). It is enlightening that the 
judge held that the objective test was also not satisfied because the words ‘I want to 
take you home for the night’ were ‘[o]bjectively, at face value, …innocuous and do 
not refer to any sexual activity. If the complainant was offended by the statements 
alone she was unreasonable’.
  While the outcome in this case would seem to be correct (perhaps a prosecutor 
should have declined to prosecute such a matter in the criminal courts or the 
prosecution should have failed as a result of the ‘seriousness’ element being absent 
(see below section 5)), it is nevertheless somewhat ingenuous of the judge to claim 
that the words carry no sexual innuendo. 
56 S v Sharp supra (n29).
57 Compare R v M supra (n18) at 342; R v Holliday supra (n44) at 401.
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the complainant.58 An explanation of these cases may be that the 
impairment of dignity is evident from the conduct itself,59 even in the 
absence of comprehension.60
5  The test for determining dignity developed by the 
Constitutional Court
In defining dignity for the purpose of civil or constitutional proceedings, 
the Constitutional Court has emphasised the individual autonomy61 
facet of dignity. I have discussed this constitutional concept of dignity, 
its relationship with a common-law idea of dignity, and the symbosis 
between the constitutional and common-law jurisprudence on the 
meaning of dignity, elsewhere.62 The constitutional analysis of dignity 
will also supplement the common-law concept of dignity for the 
purpose of determining the scope of crimen iniuria.
It has also been argued63 that the central and over-arching concept 
of human dignity in human rights ideology, and explicitly in the 
constitutional order in South Africa, provides a perfect catalyst for 
developing protection of this fundamental human right in the civil or 
private law. Although the principle of legality in criminal law operates 
as an appropriate restriction on an overly expansive definition 
of crimen iniuria, the constitutional injunction on South African 
courts to develop the common law in ways that are compatible with 
constitutional values64 and the realisation that clarity in definition of 
the scope of criminality does not necessarily preclude accommodating 
novel factual predicaments within hallowed legal definitions, will 
give added relevance and vibrancy to the protection of dignity 
within the offence of crimen iniuria. Some potential new vistas for 
the well-recognised offence of crimen iniuria that will enhance the 
Constitutional and the common-law protection of dignity are explored 
later in this article.65
58 See S v A supra (n43).
59 Such as the use of a bugging device in S v A supra (n43).
60 See Van der Berg ‘The criminal act of violation of dignitas’ op cit (n13) 362–3.
61 Referring to privacy as ‘autonomous identity’ in Bernstein v Bester NNO 1996 (2) SA 
751 (CC) at paras [65] and [67]; National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v 
Minister of Justice 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC) at para [32].
62 See the works and chapters cited above (n10).
63 See the works and chapters cited above (n10).
64 Sections 8(3)(a) and 39(2) of the Constitution of South Africa, 1996.
65 Below sections 9 and 10.
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6  Must the infringement of dignity be of a serious nature 
in order to lead to a successful criminal prosecution?
The Supreme Court of Appeal in S v Hoho,66 while rejecting a 
requirement of seriousness for the crime of defamation, assumed 
(rather than deciding) that an element of seriousness was required for 
crimen iniuria.67
Of course, it is always possible that the prosecutor might regard 
a prosecution for crimen iniuria as inappropriate because of the 
perceived triviality of the offending conduct or words.68 If, however, a 
prosecutor does instigate a prosecution for what many might consider 
a relatively trivial form of impairment of dignity, the objective standard 
of whether a reasonable person would have felt that his or her dignity 
had been impaired would still operate as a filtering mechanism.
So one could argue that a labour court judge was correct when he 
recently held that a businessman who asked a female colleague if she 
wanted a ‘lover for the night’ and when she said ‘no’, added: ‘If you 
change your mind during the night come to my room’ was not demanding 
sex, but was rather simply ‘trying his luck’. According to the judge, 
these words uttered by the businessman were inappropriate, but they 
did not justify dismissal.69 One could add that, even though the female 
colleague to whom the words were uttered may have felt subjectively 
insulted by the words, their use was not objectively unreasonable.
The fundamental reason behind the objective aspect of the test for 
dignity is to ensure that not every situation where a person is offended 
by words or conduct will result in a successful prosecution, or even 
civil suit.
There has been considerable debate on whether criminal defamation 
and/or crimen iniuria need be ‘serious’ in nature in order to be 
punishable under the criminal law. The view that criminal defamation 
need not be ‘serious’ to be punishable under the criminal law has 
apparently won the day in the recent judgment in S v Hoho.70 The 
Supreme Court of Appeal in this case assumed, but did not decide 
that an element of seriousness was required for crimen iniuria.71
66 2009 (1) SACR 276 (SCA).
67 At para [22].
68 See, for instance, Mke v Minister of Safety and Security: http://www.seri-sa.org/
index.php/litigation-9/cases/19-litigation/case-entries/128-mke. 
69 L Wagner ‘ “Trying his luck” was not sexual harassment, court finds’ Business Day 
Live, 5 June 2014, available at www.bdlive.co.za/national/2014/06/05/ trying-his-
luck-was-not-sexual-harassment, accessed on 22 July 2014. 
70 Supra (n66).
71 Factors that South African courts have regarded as pointing towards the seriousness 
of the infringement of dignity or privacy are listed in Burchell Principles op cit (n3) 
635-7.
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In S v Bugwandeen,72 a ‘seriousness’ requirement for crimen iniuria 
was rejected as imprecise and nebulous.73
The criminal law does not in principle distinguish between 
serious and non-serious criminality, although naturally the degree of 
seriousness of the offence is highly relevant to sentence, as opposed 
to verdict or conviction. In fact, much of the debate surrounding 
whether some special crimes should require this nebulous element of 
seriousness has been rendered unnecessary by the clear recognition 
in De Lange v Costa74 that the true standard for determining dignity is 
that of a reasonable person. An objective criterion of reasonableness 
in fact provides a test that serves to limit liability to those instances 
perceived (at least by the judiciary) to involve objectively unreasonable 
conduct. The seriousness of the words used or the conduct perpetrated 
by the accused is a factor in the total inquiry into reasonableness. A 
value judgment based on a hallowed standard of the reasonable person 
(although also not totally immune from a challenge of vagueness) 
is nevertheless judicially familiar and sufficiently predictable in 
generating a reliable and just result in each case.
7  Mens rea for crimen iniuria
In South African criminal law, dolus eventualis is sufficient mens rea 
for all intention-based crimes and crimen iniuria is no exception.75 
Knowledge (or at least foresight) of unlawfulness is, according to 
general principles, a part of intention.76
8  Expansively interpreting the common law from a dignity 
perspective in preference to the enactment of a criminal 
statutory provision prohibiting specific impairments of 
dignity
The existence of a common-law crime of crimen iniuria, including 
a broad (yet sufficiently demarcated) protection of the various facets 
of human dignity or privacy, offers considerable advantages over the 
introduction of complex criminal statutory provisions. Here are a few 
examples:
72 1987 (1) SA 787 (N).
73 A gravity element is also rejected by J Van der Berg ‘Is gravity really an element of 
crimen iniuria and criminal defamation in our law?’ (1988) 51 THRHR 54-73 and J 
Van der Berg ‘The criminal act of violation of dignitas’ op cit (n13) 375.
74 Supra (n54).
75 S v Steenberg 1999 (1) SACR 594 (N).
76 As a result of the decision of the Appellate Division in S v De Blom 1977 (3) SA 513 
(A).
Protecting dignity under common law and the Constitution:  
The significance of crimen iniuria in South African criminal law 261
SACJ-2014-3-Text.indd   261 02/03/2015   07:48
(i) The boundaries of theft
Traditionally the common-law crime of theft has involved appropriation 
of tangible77 property. Although the South African courts have 
extended the definition of theft to include the appropriation of credit,78 
the courts have (so far, at least) not included ‘ideas’ as capable of being 
criminally stolen, preferring to use intellectual property law or the 
recent protection of information legislation79 to regulate this area.
However, a fertile ground for criminal prosecution in this electronic 
age surely lies in the area of what is called ‘identity theft’. Naturally, 
identity is part of dignity and so appropriating another’s identity would 
constitute crimen iniuria, whether in the guise of an impairment of 
dignity or an infringement of privacy.
Of course, if the conduct takes the form of a fraudulent 
misrepresentation, then a conviction of fraud would also be available. 
The South African definition of fraud includes not just the causing 
of actual prejudice by means of misrepresentation, but also potential 
prejudice, so the possibility of a successful conviction of attempted 
fraud is thereby reduced. Thus, conduct such as ‘phishing’ might 
constitute actual, rather than attempted, fraud in South African law. 
However, ‘phishing’ could also constitute crimen iniuria or attempted 
crimen iniuria by invading another’s private sphere or usurping his or 
her identity or trying to do so.
It is submitted that the current definition of crimen iniuria is 
sufficiently well established and clear and that the inclusion of novel 
factual circumstances can be accommodated within this established 
definition of crimen iniuria without any infringement of the principle 
of legality.80
Invoking the common-law of theft and arguing that this definition 
should be extended to cover theft of ideas would be more problematic 
because the jurisprudence on the ambit of the crime of theft appears, 
at least at the moment, specifically to preclude the appropriation 
of intangibles, such as ideas. Using the judicial recognition of theft 
of credit some forty years ago to try to open a door to punishing 
appropriations of other intangible commodities (which may also have 
an economic equivalent or value) might, at first sight, seem to provide 
an arguable route to criminalising identity appropriation under the 
77 Ie corporeal. See the debate on the characteristics of electricity in S v Mintoor 1996 
(1) SACR 514 (C) and S v Ndebele 2012 (1) SACR 245 (GSJ), discussed in Burchell 
Principles op cit (n3) at 37-8.
78 See S v Graham 1975 (3) SA 569 (A) at 575H and Burchell Principles op cit (n3) 42 
and 690-1.
79 See (n51).
80 K Phelps ‘A dangerous precedent indeed – A response to CR Snyman’s note on 
Masiya’ (2008) 125 SALJ 648 at 651.
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common law. However, the use of the common law of theft in this 
way could well run up against fundamental challenges to the principle 
of legality. This line of reasoning might evoke the legitimate criticism 
that the definition of the crime of theft is being extended beyond its 
original scope and purpose. The legislature, expressing the will of the 
elected representatives of the people, rather than the courts expressing 
the view of judges might be regarded as a more appropriate forum for 
developing the law of theft, if the courts were to decide not to include 
identity appropriation under crimen iniuria.
However, it is suggested that a charge of crimen iniuria (combined, 
of course, with a charge of fraud) would provide already available 
common-law redress for ‘identity theft’, without any need to enact time-
consuming, complex legislative provisions governing ‘identity theft’.
(ii) Liability of a police trap
A police trap that unfairly induces Y to commit a crime that he or 
she was not predisposed to commit, would clearly interfere with the 
dignity of Y by treating him or her simply as a means to the end 
of crime control rather than treating him or her as an autonomous 
individual.81
Regarding the impermissible trapping of an individual as an 
impairment of the dignity of the person entrapped could form the basis 
of the future development of a constitutional defence of entrapment 
operating in tandem with s 252A of the Criminal Procedure Act that 
provides for the inadmissibility of evidence obtained by a trap in 
certain circumstances.
Furthermore, the fundamental presumption of innocence, which 
quite clearly underscores the dignity and autonomy of the arrested 
person (by not treating that person merely as a means to an end) 
would demand that Wallis AJA’s prima facie view82 in S v Kotzè83 was 
correct. Wallis JA took the view that merely placing an onus of proof 
on a balance of probabilities on the state to justify the use of the trap84 
would be incompatible with the Constitution – the state should bear 
the general onus of proof beyond reasonable doubt.
81 I H Dennis ‘Restructuring the law of criminal evidence’ (1989) 42 Current Legal 
Problems 21, esp at 35ff; C Hoexter ‘Administrative justice and dishonesty’ (1994) 
111 SALJ 700 at 717 (who specifically mentions that trapping may infringe the right 
to a fair trial but she also mentions, in the same context, the rights to equality and 
dignity); and Hoctor op cit (n5) at 315.
82 In the absence of argument in the case.
83 2010 (1) SACR 100 (SCA) at para [20].
84 As was suggested by Bozalek J in S v Reeding 2005 (2) SACR 631 (C) at 639-40.
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(iii) Sexual offences
The suppleness of crimen iniuria provides a potential and viable 
means of enhancing the quality of human relationships by punishing 
unacceptable behaviour such as sexual harassment and sexual 
‘grooming’ of children.85
The Supreme Court of Appeal in Mugridge v S86 confirmed the 
conviction and sentence of 18 months’ imprisonment of the appellant 
for crimen iniuria relating to sexual abuse of the complainant (who was, 
at the time the abuse started, his 14-year-old adopted daughter). The 
appellant’s conviction for rape with a sentence of 15 years’ imprisonment 
and indecent assault with a sentence of 18 months’ imprisonment were 
also confirmed by the Supreme Court of Appeal.87 Although it is not 
entirely clear from the judgment what precise manifestations of sexual 
abuse in this case amounted to crimen iniuria, it seems reasonably 
clear from the following passage of the judgment that ‘sexual grooming’ 
was the essence of the crimen iniuria conviction. After referring to the 
concept of ‘sexual grooming’, Erasmus JA said:
‘[The appellant] … had manipulated the complainant’s fragile state and his 
stature in the community to his advantage, slowly inviting her to acquiesce 
to his advances88 [and he] went out of his way to entice the complainant’s 
consent by effectively subduing her ability to give consent freely and 
voluntarily.’
This conduct on the part of the appellant would undoubtedly amount 
to a serious affront to the complainant’s dignity and so constitute 
crimen iniuria.
The Supreme Court of Appeal rejected the appellant’s contention 
that the complainant had consented to any of this (or any other sexual 
behaviour by him towards her) or of ‘perceived acquiescence or 
submission’ on his [the appellant’s] part.89
The common law on crimen iniuria, facilitated by the notion of 
attempted crimen iniuria, is clearly broad enough to include sexual 
grooming of the type that the complainant experienced in M’s case.
85 See Burchell Principles op cit (n3) at 639 and Mugridge v S (657/12) [2013] ZASCA 
43 (28 March 2013) where, on facts arising before the introduction of a statutory 
definition of sexual grooming (sections 18 and 24 of the Criminal Law (Sexual 
Offences and Related Matters) Act 32 of 2007) came into operation (16 December 
2007, the Supreme Court of Appeal nevertheless regarded sexual grooming of 
young persons as criminal. 
86 Supra (n85).
87 The appellants’ convictions and sentences for fraud and contravening certain 
statutory provisions punishing possession of drugs and child pornography were 
not appealed.
88 At para [52].
89 At para [53].
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The legislature has, however, seen fit to criminalise sexual grooming 
of children and mentally incapable persons under ss 18 and 24 of 
the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment 
Act of 2007.90 The complex wording of this statutory intervention 
regarding sexual grooming has yet to be tested in the courts. It is, 
nevertheless, arguable that the common law of crimen iniuria, which 
has thankfully not been specifically repealed by the sexual offences 
legislation, can still operate as a back-up charge if the legislation is 
ultimately seen as inadequate or overly complex.
In general, failed prosecutions for rape under the sexual offences 
legislation (where, for instance, sexual penetration cannot be 
established) or other sexual offences falling short of actual sexual 
violation might well still result in successful prosecutions for crimen 
iniuria where the complainant’s dignity has nevertheless been 
impaired by the accused’s conduct.
(iv) Harassment and stalking
Although the crime of crimen injuria is clearly broad enough to 
include conduct such as harassment and stalking (as constituting both 
a serious impairment of the dignity and/or invasion of privacy of the 
person stalked), the legislature has similarly preferred to criminalise 
harassment and stalking by statute under the Protection from 
Harassment Act of 2011.91
In instances (i) to (iv) above, it might be argued that parliament 
is the most appropriate forum for any development of the scope of 
criminality and that, in terms of the fundamental principle of legality, 
courts of law should refrain from this task, leaving the list of common 
definitions of crime closed. This argument is, however, most persuasive 
where the common law clearly contains no definition of criminality of 
the conduct requiring proscription or specifically precludes criminality.
In the case of crimen iniuria a reasonable precise definition of 
criminality already exists and no judgment precludes crimen iniuria 
covering sexual grooming or stalking. Furthermore, the traditional 
approach to legality92 is most compelling in countries that do not have 
either an over-arching Bills of Rights or where the Bill of Rights does 
90 Which came into operation on 16 December 2007.
91 17 of 2011, which came into operation on 27 April 2013.
92 As argued by CR Snyman ‘Extending the scope of rape – A dangerous precedent: 
note’ (2007) 124 SALJ 677 at 677-8.
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not include a specific injunction to courts to develop the criminal law 
in accordance with the Bill of Rights.93
9  Limiting the scope of common-law principles using a 
dignity perspective
9.1  Compelled killing of another
In terms of common-law principles the decision in S v Goliath94 that 
compulsion (human threats from another) can, in principle, constitute 
a complete defence to the killing of an innocent person – a principle 
that seems to have been accepted as part of the edifice of the South 
African criminal law – could, for instance, be re-assessed within a 
constitutional ‘dignity imperative’ that presupposes that all lives are 
equal. Is a person entitled (in a situation where there is no self-defence 
or war-time predicament) to take the life of another or others as a 
means of saving his or her own life or others, without fundamentally 
compromising this imperative?
If such a constitutional challenge were mounted against the Goliath 
judgments that make the defence of compulsion available in principle 
against all crimes, including murder, the Constitutional Court might 
well conclude that all lives are of equal value and so compulsion cannot 
now amount to a ground of justification for the murder of an innocent 
person, although it might constitute a personal excuse, either in the 
German sense 95 or as a putative defence96 in the South African setting.
If the court focused more on the specific facets of the dignity of 
both the accused and the victim identified in this article, it could 
perhaps conclude that the inherent and equal human worth of the 
innocent victim should not necessarily be sacrificed on the altar of 
the compelled accused’s compromised autonomy or that it would 
constitute unfair discrimination to elevate the accused’s predicament 
above those of the victim.
93 See K Phelps op cit (n80). The South African Constitution of 1996 specifically requires 
a court, in giving effect to a right in the Bill of Rights, to develop, where necessary, 
‘the common law to the extent that legislation does not give effect to that right’ (s 
8(3)(a)) and obliges the courts when ‘developing the common law or customary law’ 
to ‘promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights’ (s 39(2)). See Masiya 
v Director of Public Prosecutions, Pretoria (Centre for Applied Legal Studies, Amici 
Curiae) 2007 (5) SA 30 (CC), discussed in Burchell Principles op cit (n3) 39-42.
94 1972 (3) SA 1 (A).
95 See Burchell Principles op cit (n3) 179-80.
96 Op cit (n3) 127 and 399-405.
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9.2  Killing in defence of property
The controversial judgment of the Appellate Division in Ex parte Die 
Minister van Justisie: In re S v Van Wyk97 (accepting, in principle, the 
defence of killing in defence of property in special circumstances) may 
also be successfully challenged as undermining the fundamental emphasis 
on the right to life – and also the right to dignity – under the South African 
Constitution.98 The Van Wyk judgments on legal principle would lead to 
the constitutionally unacceptable conclusion that the right to property 
could (albeit only in very special circumstances) trump the right to life.
Recent versions of s 49 of the Criminal Procedure Act, regulating 
the use of force (including lethal force) by state officials in affecting an 
arrest or in apprehending a fleeing suspect have clearly been confined 
to the threat of serious physical violence (not just a threat to property) 
to arrestor or others99 and the law should also confine the use of force 
in defence of property to the use of non-lethal force.
10  Potential future development of the concept of dignity
Development of ‘dignity’ beyond the judicially-recognised concepts 
of ‘disrespectful words’, ‘privacy’ (or ‘autonomy’) and identity to 
include unlawful infringements, ‘equality’ and ‘freedom’ would, it is 
submitted, serve to unlock the true potential of the civil100 and the 
criminal remedy for impairment of dignity.
10.1  Equality as a facet of dignity101
The concept of indignity, it could be argued, is broad enough to cover 
aspects of unlawful discrimination102 by virtue of the constitutional 
protection of equal worth of everyone.103
97 1967 (1) SA 488 (A).
98 See further, Burchell Principles op cit (n3) at 135-8.
99 See further op cit (n3) at 147-8.
100 An argument for the development of the concept of ‘dignity’ in the civil law is 
developed by the present author in Rights of Personality in Scots Law: A Comparative 
Perspective op cit (n10).
101 On the broad nature of the debate on equality and dignity, see Rights of Personality 
in Scots Law op cit (n10) 360-2; A Fagan ‘Dignity and unfair discrimination: a value 
misplaced and a right misunderstood’ (1998) 14 SAJHR 220-247; C Albertyn and B 
Goldblatt ‘Facing the challenge of transformation; difficulties in the development of 
an indigenous jurisprudence of equality’ (1998) 14 SAJHR 248-276; D Davis ‘Equality: 
the majesty of Legoland jurisprudence’ (1999) 116 SALJ 398-414; and S Cowen ‘Can 
“dignity” guide South Africa’s equality jurisprudence’ (2001) 17 SAJHR 34 at 55.
102 JM Burchell ‘Beyond the glass bead game’ op cit (n10) 17 and Rights of Personality 
in Scots Law op cit (n10) 361-3.
103 See Ackermann’s discussion of the inherent link between dignity and equality in 
the writing of Immanuel Kant (op cit (n2) 554-62, esp 56).
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Of course, the Equality Court can, in terms of s 21 of the Promotion 
of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000, 
determine that a person has unfairly discriminated against another 
person or persons on grounds of race or any other ground recognised 
by the Constitution. However, it is unclear whether such unlawful 
conduct can, under the statute, amount to a crime. If the suggested 
approach of giving a wide meaning to dignity is followed, the 
discriminatory conduct in question could nevertheless amount to 
crimen iniuria.
10.2  Freedom as a facet of dignity
As Ackermann has convincingly argued, human dignity must also 
include freedom:
‘If … an important aspect of human dignity is the capacity to exercise one’s 
own judgment, to shape oneself, to develop one’s personality and to strive for 
self-fulfilment…then freedom is essential for the exercise of these capacities, 
forms an integral part of these capacities, and indeed constitutes a capacity 
of this nature.’ 104
For instance, the individual’s right to die with dignity, at least under 
limited and controlled circumstances,105 involves the exercise of an 
individual’s freedom. Freedom and autonomy are intimately related.
11  The argument against overloading the concept of dignity
Some have argued that dignity is difficult enough to define, even in 
its most limited form, and that it is virtually impossible to describe 
dignity if it is seen as including not just individual worth, autonomy 
and identity, but also freedom and equality.106 Perhaps specifically 
identifying the sub-category of dignity that is being weighed in the 
balance,107 will help to reduce risk of confusion and the possibility 
of internal contradictions – a pursuit of clarity of definition that is, of 
course, needed to repel any challenge under the ius certum aspect of 
the principle of legality. In the furtherance of clarity in expression, it 
104 Op cit (n2) at 103. Ackermann finds this conclusion compatible with Kantian ethics; 
‘For Kant, autonomy or freedom is not only a pre-condition for dignity, but also a 
necessary element of dignity (Ackermann’s emphasis).
105 See Burchell Principles op cit (n3) at 207-13.
106 It could be argued that the development of a concept of privacy in the United States 
from the right to be let alone to its inclusion of manifestations of individual choice 
relating to procreation and education in fact extends the meaning of privacy to 
breaking point: see Burchell Personality Rights and Freedom of Expression op cit 
(n9) 367-8. 
107 See 3.1 – 3.3 above.
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might be useful to think about dignity as the genus and self-worth, 
autonomy, privacy, equality, freedom and identity (including self-
fulfilment) as the species within this genus.
Even if this clarity of definition is not achieved, Henk Botha has 
convincingly argued that dignity’s very ‘ambiguity’ and ‘paradoxical 
nature’ might indicate its significance in guiding and constraining 
constitutional interpretation:
‘Perhaps, then, the capacity of dignity to guide and structure constitutional 
discourse lies in the way in which it suspends legal decision making 
between the universal and the particular, between the transcendental and 
the contingent. Dignity demands unwavering commitment to the inviolability 
of each human person. And yet, it can only be honoured through careful 
engagement with the particularity of local contexts. Dignity requires respect 
for the constitutive role of culture, religion, family and community. At the 
same time, however, it insists on the capacity of individuals to transcend the 
strictures of their own background and helps to infuse egalitarian norms into 
these spheres.’108
It might appear to involve an internal contradiction or paradox 
that, in determining the scope of crimen iniuria, my dignity (in 
the form of freedom of expression) must in law be balanced against 
your dignity not to be insulted by my words or conduct. If one 
distinguishes between the true facets of dignity (as outlined in this 
article), contradiction or inconsistency can be avoided. My autonomy 
is not necessarily coextensive or inevitably self-destructive of your 
self-worth. A court can, and must, balance these two differing facets 
of dignity and determine, in the circumstances, which facet is to be 
given pre-eminence.
A major advantage of this suggested approach of identifying the 
specific facets of dignity, is that it should encourage tighter, rather 
than looser, legal reasoning. For instance, Hoctor has argued that 
the common purpose principle of imputed criminal liability could 
perhaps be rationalised as a manifestation of dignity in the form of 
individual autonomy – presumably on the basis that joining or not 
joining a criminal venture is a manifestation of individual choice and 
criminal consequences may appropriately be attached to this exercise 
of choice.109 An individual clearly has the choice to engage in joint 
criminal activity or refrain from such a course of conduct. However, 
imposing on X what amounts to a principle of ‘guilt by association’ 
by automatically imputing the legal consequences of the conduct of 
another member of the criminal enterprise (Y) to X and so finding 
X liable as a co-perpetrator in Y’s crime is undoubtedly treating X 
108 Botha op cit (n2) 219.
109 Hoctor op cit (n5) 316n87.
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as a means to the end110 of crime control, so denying his intrinsic 
worth and identity, not to mention unfairly discriminating between 
him (for the purposes of causal attribution) and a person accused of 
committing the same consequence crime as the actual perpetrator and 
who is not a member of any common criminal purpose.
12  Penalty for crimen iniuria
Currently, one of the most serious forms of verbal crimen iniuria 
would seem to be the use of the word ‘kaffir’. However, even in a case 
where the complainant to whom this obnoxious term was used was 
singled out as the only black police officer present, the high court (on 
appeal) reduced the sentence of 4 months’ imprisonment for crimen 
iniuria imposed by the magistrate to a sentence of a fine (to wit R3 
000 or 6 months’ in prison, with half of the fine and half of the period 
of imprisonment suspended for 5 years).
The extent of the penalty for impairment of dignity arising out of the 
use of such offensive words should not, however, lead us to conclude 
that crimen iniuria does not fall into the category of particularly 
serious offences. If crimen iniuria takes the form of a sexual offence 
(short of provable rape), stalking or ‘identity theft’ as opposed to 
speech, conviction could result in punishment that might well include 
a period of imprisonment.
13  Conclusion
If we take human rights seriously and acknowledge that, in the end, 
humanitarian justice must fulfil the idealistic promises of constitutional 
justice, we should use all the legal means available to us to protect this 
precious and pivotal right to dignity.
South Africa has recently emerged from an oppressive political 
era where dignity was trampled on, but we have now fashioned a 
sophisticated Constitution that will stand as a bulwark against future 
debasing of the fundamental right of all to dignity.
A dignity-centred ideology is already in place. We must now translate 
this right to dignity into practice. The crime of crimen iniuria (like 
its private law counterpart, the remedy for impairment of dignity and 
privacy under the modern actio iniuriarum) constitutes a potent legal 
and educational method, based firmly in Roman law and developed 
both in case law and the Constitution, for translating our commitment 
to the cause of dignity into practical reality. The existing concept of 
dignity in the South African jurisprudence already embraces ideas 
110 In Kantian terms.
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of autonomy, uniqueness, self-worth, identity and privacy. Now 
is a timely opportunity for courts to consolidate and affirm these 
existing attributes of dignity by utilising the current definition of, and 
jurisprudence on, crimen iniuria and also to include the protection 
of freedom and equality within the meaning of dignity potentially 
protected by the scope of crimen iniuria. The same process of 
consolidation, affirmation and inclusion should also apply to the civil-
law remedy for impairment of dignity under the Roman-inspired actio 
iniuriarum.111
In this way, symmetry between the values set out in the Constitution 
and the values underlying the criminal (and civil) law will be 
established and courts will fulfil their obligation to develop the South 
African common law to reflect fundamental rights protected in our 
Constitution. Most importantly, we will begin to translate the promises 
of constitutional justice into the reality of humanitarian justice.
111 See the literature cited above (n10).
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